Κυριακή 22 Δεκεμβρίου 2013
One week to Carnival! Who has already begun the countdown? Falta una semana para el Carnaval! Quien está en el conteo regresivo?
Παρασκευή 20 Δεκεμβρίου 2013
Suomalaisilla on monta syytä oppia tuntemaan venäläisten ajattelua.
.
järki ei riitä selittämään tapahtumia, avuksi tulee tunne. Tähän liittyy myös venäläinen sielu, joka kylpee kärsimyksessä
.
Pidemmistä hetkistä kaksi on ylitse muiden. Hurmaavassa Linnankosken lukiossa arvostettu rouva emeritalehtori oli perustanut viimeisenä työvuotenaan kurssin nimeltä Kasvien salattu maailma. Kurssi kummitteli haamuna vuosia papereissa tunnuksella Bi7, kunnes päätin ilman sen kummempaa osaamista herättää kurssin henkiin. Valoisaan biologian luokkaan ilmestyi huhtikuun alussa 31 lukion hymyilevintä tyttöä ja yksi poika (josta pidettiin kurssilla hyvää huolta). Opettelimme tunnistamaan kasveja, teimme joitakin kokeita, seikkailimme kasvitieteellisellä puutarhalla ja hymyilimme. Koko kevät kirmattiin voikukkaseppele kutreilla. Tuskin kukaan meistä oppi elämässä hyödyllisiä tietoja ja taitoja. Tuon kurssin jälkeen en ole sellaisia edes kaivannut.sipuran mika, tässä aines
Why Steven Pinker, Like Jared Diamond, Is Wrong
Tuesday, 11 June 2013 09:25 By Stephen Corry, Truthout | Op-Ed
179
font size
Print
Email
Steven Pinkner, taking part in the TESL conference at Thompson Rivers University, Oct. 12, 2012. (Photo: Thompson Rivers University)I recently attacked Jared Diamond's view that most tribal peoples live in a state of constant warfare. This old colonial idea was first popularly resurrected by Steven Pinker, not Diamond, so it's time to peruse the former's book, The Better Angels of Our Nature.
I battled my way through Better Angels. By the end, I was worn down by the faulty facts and attempts to lead the reader astray. Almost wherever one probes Pinker's facts, they crumble.
Let's start at the beginning for a perfect example of how Pinker leads us on. He takes only a single page of preamble before he tries to sell us his grisly thesis, which as far as I can understand it, is that everyone was once generally violent and horrible (tribal people still are, because apparently they are living relics of the past). Darwinian selection favored the most aggressive towards outsiders, and nicest to insiders. They had lots of children who went on to create states, which were generally nice, and imposed peace and "prosperity."(1)
Better Angels opens with a rhetorical question, "What is it about the ancients that they couldn't leave us an interesting corpse without resorting to foul play?"
Exhibit number one is the 5,200 year-old "Iceman," nicknamed "Ötzi." As Pinker breathes with Hitchcockian crescendo, "[Ötzi] had not fallen in a crevasse and frozen to death, as scientists had originally surmised; he had been murdered." Here is Pinker's very first "Murder Most Foul."
Introducing Ötzi with a list of his kit, "ax and backpack, a quiver of fletched arrows, a wood-handled dagger… ," Pinker's deduction seems straightforward. But, although scientists have come up with dozens of guesses about how Ötzi met his end, Pinker offers us just one "reconstruction:" He thinks Ötzi "belonged to a raiding party that clashed with a neighboring tribe."(2)
I will avoid bending the facts to fit a hypothesis, and cross-examine the evidence. The Iceman had three significant wounds: a cut hand; an arrowhead in his back, and a blow to his head. It was a violent death, but did it result from a clash between tribes?
Donning our Sherlock Holmes deerstalker hat, let's scrutinize Pinker's list of Ötzi's possessions, for it is largely from these that the accusation is construed. It suggests that if Ötzi really was looking for a fight, he was more Marx Brother than Navy SEAL. The flint blade of his dagger was tiny, about one-third the length of a table knife. It would have been great for skinning game, but feeble as a weapon. His bow was half-made, not even notched to take a string; twelve of the fourteen arrows, too, were neither fletched nor had arrowheads. Pinker is fond of statistics, so here's one: 100% of Ötzi's weapons were duds.
The raiding party reconstruction collapses, so let's posit an alternative fantasy. Suppose Ötzi is resting after his ascent when he's shot by an inexperienced hunter looking for game. He flails in agony, inadvertently smashing his head on a rock but succeeding in pulling out the arrowshaft. It may all have been a hunting accident - not foul play at all.(3) If detectives were called to a contemporary scene, would they ejaculate "Murder!" with such alacrity? Surely not, if they were Poirot rather than Clouseau. Wouldn't Pinker be the first to reach for the statistics?
He might, for example, compare the number of Italian hunters murdered (about one every couple of months) to those killed accidentally while hunting. In October 2012, the month after the season started, thirteen hunters had died in shooting accidents. In other words, it is 26 times more likely for a hunter to die in a hunting accident than to be murdered, at least at the start of the season.
Bearing in mind that Ötzi was not equipped for a raid, that today's hunters have had millennia to improve their safety record, that modern hunters don't disguise themselves in animal furs, like those Ötzi was wearing, is it not more likely that this was a case of accidental death?(3)
I stress that I am not putting it forward as a theory: My point is simply that the chances of Ötzi being in a raiding party are close to zero. Though my facts are true, my proposition is facetious. I have no idea how Ötzi died - but nor does Pinker.
As I've demonstrated, there is plenty in Pinker's first few pages that is plain wrong. He selects, bends and omits facts; he claims his methods are scientific, but they aren't. Pinker's data is not irrefutable, and I am far from the first to question his conclusions.(4)
Pinker picks his victims with hindsight, but we can now pass a ruling on his supposed rhetorical submission, "What is it about the ancients that they couldn't leave us an interesting corpse without resorting to foul play?" The verdict is simple: They could and did.
There are many other examples of tendentiousness in Pinker's endless depiction of the violent past. His facts shake and buckle under cross-examination. Look at how he approaches the An Lushan revolt in eighth century China, labeling it, "the worst atrocity of all time… that, according to censuses, resulted in the loss of… a sixth of the world's population." He cites Matthew White, but White himself puts the figure at "just" 13 million. This doesn't stop Pinker from gleefully and unequivocally declaring it the world's worst atrocity (which it isn't, according to White's latest guess).
Consider, also, his glib assertion, "There is no indication that anyone but Hitler and a few fanatical henchmen thought it was a good idea for the Jews to be exterminated." Recent research has found 42,500 institutions set up to perpetrate the Holocaust. According to Geoffrey Megargee, "Many more people knew about it and took part in it … it was central to the entire Nazi system … many other countries had their own camp systems."(5) Pinker's description is hardly uncontentious.
When Pinker's opinion unabashedly shines through, it's easy to see where he's coming from. In his third chapter, pure prejudice runs amok.
The section begins with a look at the statistics of "declining" homicide rates in Europe (which his graphs show as recently increasing) and then degenerates into a "Tales from the Crypt" or "Horrible Histories" version of "medieval," whom Pinker condemns as "childish," "gross," "boorish," "animalistic" and "immature," lacking all "refinement, self-control, and consideration."
As proof of Middle Age depravity, Pinker cites a c. 1480 manuscript, which he calls "a depiction of daily life." He reproduces drawings of people behaving grossly, entitled Saturn and Mars, but omits to tell us that they are intended to show the effects engendered by those planets, not "daily life" at all. Plenty of other drawings in the book show people going about their lives perfectly politely (busily undermining his theory).
This, of course, is the time of the extraordinarily original European cathedrals, of Thomas Aquinas, whose work has been called the philosophical foundation from which science originates.(6) It was an age when Renaissance ideas started to be forged, when Francis of Assisi and Hildegard of Bingen promulgated revolutionary notions about humanity.
Pinker believes that industrialized people today are better than anyone else, and makes the astonishing claim, "It was not just mundane physical comforts that our recent ancestors did without. It was also the higher and nobler things in life, such as knowledge, beauty, and human connection." This will be surprising news to most tourists in Florence or Athens.
But it is still a digression from my main point: What's the evidence concerning the violence of both our ancestors and tribal peoples today? To substantiate his claim, Pinker primarily relies on a graph comparing the percentage of "deaths in warfare" in a miniscule selection of four human "categories." The ordering of the data follows no pattern; the categorizations are also spurious. The idea that this is a scientific representation of anything is nonsense.
The percentages of war deaths for modern states are, in Pinker's view, practically invisible. As I have looked at the smoke and mirrors used to reduce what are in fact huge numbers to Pinker's tiny ones in my criticism of Jared Diamond's book,(7) I won't go into that again. A very detailed rebuttal of this aspect of his data, especially that relating to American foreign policy, can be found in Edward S Herman and David Peterson's, "Reality Denial: Steven Pinker's Apologetics for Western-Imperial Violence."(8)
Leaving aside (for reasons of space!) those he categorizes as "hunter-gathers," the thousands of remaining tribal peoples in the world are represented by just ten; half of those are from New Guinea.(9) That's just half of one percent of all the island's "tribes." These are not selected randomly, but are those few societies where researchers have collected information on causes of death. One of them is the Dani of West Papua, an area invaded and brutally suppressed by Indonesia since the 1960s. As spokesman Markus Haluk, retorted (over Jared Diamond's book), "The total of Dani victims from the Indonesian atrocities … is far greater than those from tribal war."(10) Why aren't those deaths in Pinker's graph?
It is simply not scientific to generalize about a thousand New Guinea tribes on information from just five.
As always nowadays, whenever the "Brutal Savage" myth is invoked, Napoleon Chagnon's "sweaty, hideous"(11) Yanomami is guaranteed to career (I use the word advisedly) cinematically into sight, screaming blood-curdling growls and wails, and oozing green snot and red blood.(12) Although familiar to American college students, virtually every other scholar who has lived with the tribe considers Chagnon's characterization to be fictional.(13)
Four of the five cited non-New Guinea societies are from the Amazon, and two of those are Yanomami.(13) Looked at another way, no less than twenty percent of the data Pinker uses to categorize the violence of the entire planet's tribal peoples (excluding "hunter-gatherers") is derived from a single anthropologist, Napoleon Chagnon - whose data has been criticized for decades.(14) To put this yet another way, nearly half of all the thousands of the world's tribal peoples outside New Guinea (again excluding those Pinker has decided are "hunter-gatherers") are condemned as "Brutal Savages" on the strength of one man's account of one tribe.
The only Amazonians on the graph who are not Yanomami are the Waorani (from Ecuador) and "Jivaro" (a pejorative name for peoples straddling the Peru-Ecuador border). It's perfectly true that both had a bellicose reputation, unlike many of their neighboring tribes who simply didn't.(15) This is a very revealing point, of course: These authors cherry-pick special cases.
Before considering them, it's worth noting that Jared Diamond, who also promulgates the "Brutal Savage" myth, responded to my criticism of his book by claiming that he had the scientific data, and that I, and Survival International, romantically portray tribal peoples as universally peaceful.
Neither observation is true: The data presented by these authors is at least contentious, where it's not plain wrong, and Survival makes no secret of the fact that tribal people, like everyone, fight and kill to varying degrees. Why hide it? We have personal experience.
By way of example, when I was staying in a settlement of Aguaruna ("Jivaroans") in the 1970s, there were deadly raids on a community a couple of miles away. Through missionary and petroleum company activity, most Aguaruna had been drawn into settlements along the riverbanks, and former enmities were exacerbated by their new enforced proximity. I don't know if the high rate of deaths cited (these were raids, not "war" as such) is representative of what these peoples did before the state came along in one or other of its invasive guises, but once again - nor does Pinker.
By far the overall leader in Pinker's category of warlike folk turns out to be the Waorani of Ecuador, with over sixty percent being killed. The Waorani were undoubtedly viewed as "brutal savages" by both their Indian and non-Indian neighbors.
They live near the Napo River, a thoroughfare for centuries. Waorani raided other Indian settlements for generations, both to steal things and as a warning to stay away. Their name for all non-Waorani is cowode, meaning "cannibal." "We" might think they're pretty brutal, but it's reciprocated: They think exactly the same of "us."
Pretending that any propensity to violence exists in isolation to their centuries-old struggle against invasion just won't wash.
I have no theory about whether life with the Waorani, or any tribe, is really more threatening than in a Bogotá slum. I do know that it has never felt like that to me. Even Jared Diamond has suggested, though quietly, that the people he felt most endangered by in New Guinea were the Indonesian military, not the tribespeople.(16)
Pinker doesn't sit in judgment over just the Waorani, of course, but over all humankind. He concludes we are brutal savages until tamed by a nation state bringing peaceful civilization. As far as contemporary tribal peoples are concerned, it couldn't be further from the truth: the arrival of the state unleashes a savagery second to none in its brutality. Pinker also believes that civilization today is a function of upper class leadership and refinement trickling down to the lower orders. Many share this dogma, or a variation. For Communists, it is the Party that bestows munificence and foresight; otherwise the plot is pretty much the same. The elite - capitalist or communist - has a fierce vested interest in all of us swallowing similar hokum, even better if it's supposedly confirmed by "science" and "data."
The most curious aspect of Pinker's book is his title. I'm not convinced that, at heart, he really does think that human nature includes any "angel" at all. In his view, we are little more than animals shaped by pure biology, until the lucky (murderous) few invent the state and commerce, and are rescued by the resulting "culture." What others might call beauty, truth, goodness, or justice - those things that make the human mind different from other animals - have, in his view, only very recently come to the fore, and are still undeveloped for all who are not like "us."
He goes further; he thinks that until about 60 years ago (around the time he was born!) human beings were both "morally retarded" and less intelligent than they are now. By that, he doesn't mean everyone; for Pinker, only those who live in "liberal democracies," such as the United States or western Europe, have moved beyond their "retarded" state!
He claims scientific support for what is mere opinion by falsely charging contemporary tribal peoples, the "stateless," and all our ancestors, with more or less unremitting villainy. It's delusional nonsense - a breathtakingly arrogant, self-serving, and tired idea which diminishes human beings to something less than we really are - and were. Were such an idea to gain credence, it risks facilitating further cruelty: for example, it would falsely assert the benefits of state intervention in tribal peoples' lives, condemning some to certain death.
However, they are far from being the only ones who should watch out when Pinker's on the prowl.
If you're not one of his peers, then beware the hanging judge, whose supporters petition ad nauseam that his opinions must be taken as universal, scientific, infallible. He's certainly dangerous, but it's high time for a retrial, and perhaps there's hope for a reprieve … for all of us.
Πέμπτη 12 Δεκεμβρίου 2013
supstitution
Tampereen ja Porin, Loimaan ja Turun ja Karjaan ja Salon väliset rataosuudet ovat poissa käytöstä radalle kaatuneiden puiden vuoksi.ja mie oo menossa tenttii don mae fetish ov YourselvYhdysvaltojen Valkoisen talon edustaja vaati keskiviikkona Janukovytšia kuuntelemaan kansaa ja aloittamaan uudelleen Ukrainan yhdentymisen Euroopan kanssa.
The director of the Moscow-based institute, a hardened Russian spy Lieutenant-General Leonid Reshetnikov told Mr. Niemelainen that his agency, in addition to Russian gang embassy and Russian "cultural center", would monitor the situation with the NATO in Northern Europe. According to him, the Finnish affiliate of his institute is the springboard to Northern Europe.
"Despite some problems we have the best relations with Finland among other North European countries", explained the Russian spy why he chose Finland for North-European headquarters of his spy agency and added:
"We have very limited objective information on Finland. And not only on Finland. In general, we have enough information only on the US, and perhaps also on Germany and China. I hope that the situation will improve a bit through our center".
The report by Helsingin Sanomat, and earlier insider information caused enthusiasm among "Finnish anti-fascists", earlier called Finnish communists, since the new Russian spy Center promises them well-paid jobs with new opportunities.
As can be understood from an article on his Finnish blog, a year-long "friend of Russia", am unfrocked "anti-fascist" priest Juha Molari, who tracks the Kavkaz Center and Caucasian refugees in Helsinki, he and another better known "anti-fascist", Johan Backman, now offer their professional skills to the new Russian spy center.
Department of Monitoring
Kavkaz Center
Δευτέρα 2 Δεκεμβρίου 2013
amerikka ja saudit ostaa suomen sähköverkoVoisiko lähiöostarien räkälöitymisen kääntää voitoksi? Tätä mietin, kun HS uutisoi, että vain kaljakuppilat pärjäävät Helsingin lähiöiden vanhoissa ostoskeskuksissa.
Kaljakuppilathan ovat lähipalveluiden luontainen voittajakonsepti, jota nettikauppa tai automarketit eivät pysty tappamaan. Kun ongelma on lähipalveluiden häviäminen, kannattaako ruikuttaa siitä ainoasta pärjäävästä lähipalvelusta?
Tekisi toki mieli ruikuttaa. Meitä kunnon keskiluokkaisia lähiökansalaisia kulmakuppiloiden meno ei yleensä miellytä. Niistä poistuvat humalaiset aiheuttavat häiriöitä ja ovat ylipäätään vääriä ihmisiä. Kuppilat ovat nuhjuisia eikä niistä saa edes kunnon espressoa.
Eikä lapsia voi viedä paikkaan, jossa juodaan kaljaa.
Sen sijaan me harrastamme lähiöasukastoimintaa asukastiloissa.
Verorahoilla kustannetussa asukastilassa on hyvä juoda omakustannehintaista kahvia muiden koti-isien ja äitien kanssa. Samalla voi olla huolissaan lähipalveluista.
Asukastilan tarkoitus on tarjota mahdollisuuksia tavata lähialueen ihmisiä, tutustua ja harrastaa. Kuppilaa noin yleisesti ottaen käytetään samaan tarkoitukseen – tosin ainoat tarjolla olevat harrastukset ovat biljardi, tikanheitto ja visailut.
Englanniksi kuppilaa sanotaan pubiksi, public houseksi. Sen voisi kääntää vapaamuotoisesti vaikka asukastilaksi.
Kaljan myynti näyttää olevan jotakuinkin ainoa bisnes, joka yhä kannattaa lähiön kivijalassa. Siksi parempaa lähiötä tuskin saa aikaan taistelemalla kuppiloita vastaan. Jos kuppilatkin lähtevät, jäljelle ei jää enää mitään.
Mielekkäämpää olisi taistella muutoksen puolesta. Jos kaljakuppiloista ei voi päästä eroon, miten niistä voisi saada parempia?
Entä jos neulepiirin kokoontumiset veisi lähiökuppilaan? Voisiko yrittäjä siistiä paikat niin, että päivällä baarissa voisi kontata vauvalauma, vaikka iltaisin pöydissä istuisi setiä parantamassa maailmaa liian monen tuopin äärellä? Voisiko asukasyhdistys kokoustaa kerhotilan sijaan kuppilassa?
Suomalaisilla tuntuu olevan nykyään tapana rajata tilat tiukasti asiallisiin ja asiattomiin – asiattomissa ollaan kännissä, asiallisissa hoidetaan asioita ja ollaan siivosti. Samassa tilassa ei voi tehdä molempia. Kunnollinen perheenisä voi vetää tuhdin hiprakan viikon päätteeksi, mutta työlounaalla on sopimatonta nauttia yhtä olutta.
Putipuhtaasti asiallisten paikkojen pitämisestä ei taida lähiöissä olla bisnekseksi. Olisiko todellinen lähiön menestyskonsepti kuitenkin paikka, jossa voisi sekä hoitaa asialliset hommat että olla kuin ellun kanat?
Kuinka paljon lähiöbaarin pitäisi siistiytyä, että se voisi olla kunniallisen asukasyhdistyksen tukikohta? Ja kuinka paljon asukasyhdistyksen pitäisi löysätä pipoa, että se pystyisi asettumaan alueen asukkaiden suosimaan baariin?
Voiko kuppiloiden menestyksen kääntää lähiöiden voitoksi?
Τετάρτη 27 Νοεμβρίου 2013
Ups: Saksan keskuspankki huomasi, että euro vaikeuttaa ongelmamaiden elpymistä
Πέμπτη 14 Νοεμβρίου 2013
alternative versions ovv hegemonia
She is currently serving two years for her band's performance of a crude song in a Moscow church in February 2012.She had been on hunger strike over conditions in the prison.'We are the childre
of Dionysus, sailing in a barrel and not recognising any authority' … Nadezhda Tolokonnikova of Pussy Riot writing to Slavoj Žižek. Photograph: David Levene/AFP/Getty/Guardian
.Her father, Andrei Tolokonnikov, told Buzzfeed: “No one knows anything. There’s no proof she’s alive, we don’t know the state of her health. Is she sick? Has she been beaten?” Her husband, Petya Verzilov, has been protesting outside the colony regularly. He said: “We think they moved her to a big city to hide her. It seems they got sick of these protests. They want to cut her off from the outside world. When they moved [political prisoner Mikhail] Khodorkovsky, he was also kind of absent for two weeks. Nobody knew where he was, then he suddenly appeared in Chita."
of Dionysus, sailing in a barrel and not recognising any authority' … Nadezhda Tolokonnikova of Pussy Riot writing to Slavoj Žižek. Photograph: David Levene/AFP/Getty/Guardian
.Her father, Andrei Tolokonnikov, told Buzzfeed: “No one knows anything. There’s no proof she’s alive, we don’t know the state of her health. Is she sick? Has she been beaten?” Her husband, Petya Verzilov, has been protesting outside the colony regularly. He said: “We think they moved her to a big city to hide her. It seems they got sick of these protests. They want to cut her off from the outside world. When they moved [political prisoner Mikhail] Khodorkovsky, he was also kind of absent for two weeks. Nobody knew where he was, then he suddenly appeared in Chita."
Τετάρτη 6 Νοεμβρίου 2013
A Funny Thing Happened On The Way To The Left Forum
Πέμπτη 10 Οκτωβρίου 2013
KABULIN YLLÄ LEIJUU aina ilmalaiva
syksy on vielä loppupäästäänkin yhä isoa innoitusta Pimeydessä ja hiljaisuudessa voivat silmä ja mieli levätä. Lauhuus ja märkyys tarkoittavat nyt kosteutta, joka tekee hengitysilmasta miellyttävän ja raikkaan. - See moreIn gender studies, hegemonic masculinity is the gender practice that guarantees the dominant social position of men, and the subordinate social position of women.[1] Conceptually, hegemonic masculinity explains how and why men maintain dominant social roles over women, and other gender identities, which are perceived as “feminine” in a given society. As a sociologic concept, the hegemonic nature of “hegemonic masculinity” derives from the theory of cultural hegemony, by Antonio Gramsci, which analyzes the power relations among the social classes of a society; hence, in the term “hegemonic masculinity”, the adjective hegemonic refers to the cultural dynamics by means of which a social group claims, and sustains, a leading and dominant position in a social hierarchy; nonetheless, hegemonic masculinity embodies a form of social organization that has been sociologically challenged and changed.
The cyclical pattern of how hegemonic masculinity is produced, reproduced, and perpetuated.
The conceptual beginnings of hegemonic masculinity represented the culturally idealized form of manhood that was socially and hierarchically exclusive and concerned with bread-winning; that was anxiety-provoking and differentiated (internally and hierarchically); that was brutal and violent, pseudo-natural and tough, psychologically contradictory, and thus crisis-prone; economically rich and socially sustained.[2]
Yet, sociologists criticized that definition of hegemonic masculinity as a fixed character-type, which is analytically limited, because it excludes the complexity of different, and competing, forms of masculinity. Consequently, hegemonic masculinity was reformulated to include gender hierarchy, the geography of masculine configurations, the processes of social embodiment, and the psycho-social dynamics of the varieties of masculinity. Moreover, hegemonic masculinity is conceptually useful for understanding gender relations, and is applicable to life-span development, education, criminology, the representations of masculinity in the mass communications media, the health of men and women, and the functional structure of organizations.[3]
Πέμπτη 20 Ιουνίου 2013
I'm not a philosopher.
The concept of hegemonic masculinity first was proposed in field reports from a study of social inequality in Australian high schools;[4] in a related conceptual discussion of the making of masculinities and the experiences of men’s bodies;[5] and in a debate over the role of men in Australian labor politics.[6] These beginnings were organized into an article[7] which critiqued the “male sex role” literature and proposed a model of multiple masculinities and power relations. This model was integrated into a systematic sociological theory of gender. The resulting six pages in Gender and Power by R. W. Connell[8] on “hegemonic masculinity and emphasized femininity” became the most cited source for the concept of hegemonic masculinity.[3] This concept draws its theoretical roots from the Gramscian term hegemony as it was used to understand the stabilization of class relations. The idea was then transferred to the problem of gender relations.
Hegemonic masculinity draws some of its historical roots from both the fields of social psychology and sociology which contributed to the literature about the male sex role that had begun to recognize the social nature of masculinity and the possibilities of change in men’s conduct.[9] This literature preceded the Women’s Liberation Movement and feminist theories of patriarchy which also played a strong role in shaping the concept of hegemonic masculinity. The core concepts of power and difference were found in the gay liberation movement which had not only sought to analyze the oppression of men but also oppression by men.[10] This idea of a hierarchy of masculinities has since persisted and strongly influenced the reformulation of the concept.
Empirical social research also played an important role as a growing body of field studies documented local gender hierarchies and local cultures of masculinities in schools,[11] male-dominated workplaces,[12] and village communities.[13] Finally, the concept was influenced by psychoanalysis.[3] Sigmund Freud produced the first analytic biographies of men and showed how adult personality was a system under tension and psychoanalyst Stoller[14] popularized the concept of gender identity and mapped its variation in boys’ development.
Original framework[edit]
Originally, 
hegemonic masculinity was understood as the pattern of practice that allowed men’s dominance over women to continue. In Western society, the dominant form of masculinity or the cultural ideal of manhood was primarily reflective of white, heterosexual, largely middle-class males. The ideals of manhood espoused by the dominant masculinity suggested a number of characteristics that men are encouraged to internalize into their own personal codes and which form the basis for masculine scripts of behavior. These characteristics include: violence and aggression, emotional restraint, courage, toughness, risk-taking, competitiveness, and achievement and success.[2] Within that overall framework there were also specific gender relations of dominance and subordination between groups of men. The most salient example of this approach in contemporary European and American society is the dominance of heterosexual men and the subordination of homosexual men. This was manifested in political and cultural exclusion, legal violence, street violence, and economic discrimination.[1] Gay masculinity was the most conspicuous subordinated masculinity during this period of time, but not the only one. Heterosexual men and boys with effeminate characteristics ran the risk of being scorned as well.
Complicity to the aforementioned masculine characteristics was another key feature of the original framework of hegemonic masculinity. Most men do not actually meet the normative standards of hegemonic masculinity and the number practicing the hegemonic pattern may be quite small.[1] Yet still since men benefit from the patriarchal dividend, they generally gain from the overall subordination of women. However, complicity is not so easily defined as pure subordination since marriage, fatherhood, and community life often involve extensive compromises with women rather than simple domination over them. In this way hegemony is not gained through necessarily violent or forceful means, but it is achieved through culture, institutions, and persuasions.[3]
The interplay of gender with class and race creates more extensive relationships among masculinities. For example, new information technology has redefined middle-class masculinities and working-class masculinities in different ways. In a racial context, hegemonic masculinity among whites sustains the institutional oppression and physical terror that have framed the making of masculinities in black communities.[3] It has been suggested that historically suppressed groups like inner city African-American males exhibit the more violent standards of hegemonic masculinity in response to their own subordination and lack of control.[1] This idea of marginalization is always relative to what is allowed by the dominant group, therefore creating subsets of hegemonic masculinity based on existing social hierarchies.
Criticisms[edit]
As the earliest model of this concept grew, so did the scrutiny and criticisms surrounding it. The following principal criticisms have been identified since debate about the concept began in the early 1990s.[3]
Underlying concept of masculinity[edit]
The underlying concept of masculinity has been argued as flawed from both a realist and a poststructuralist point of view. To Hearn,[15] the concept of masculinity is blurred, uncertain in its meaning, and tends to deemphasize issues of power and domination. To Petersen,[16] the concept of masculinity is flawed because it reduces the character of men or imposes a false unity of a fluid and contradictory reality. The concept of masculinity is criticized for being framed within a heteronormative conception of gender that oversimplified male-female difference and ignores differences and exclusions within the gender categories. The concept of masculinity is said to rest logically on a dichotomization of sex (biological) and gender (cultural) and thus marginalizes or naturalizes the body. Brod[17] observes that there is a tendency in men’s studies field to proceed as if women were not a relevant part of the analysis and therefore to analyze masculinities by looking only at men and relations among men. Therefore a consistently relational approach to gender is being called upon.
Ambiguity and overlap[edit]
Early criticisms of the concept raised the question of who actually represents hegemonic masculinity.[3] Many men who hold great social power do not embody an ideal masculinity. Martin[18] criticizes the concept for leading to inconsistent applications sometimes referring to a fixed type and other times to whatever the dominant form is. Wetherell and Edley[19] contend this concept fails to specify what conformity to hegemonic masculinity actually looks like in practice. Similarly Whitehead[20] suggests there is confusion over who actually is a hegemonically masculine man.
The problem of realness[edit]
It has also been argued that the concept of hegemonic masculinity does not adequately describe a realness of power. Holter[21] argues that the concept constructs power from the direct experience of women rather than from the structural basis of women’s subordination. Holter believes in distinguishing between patriarchy and gender and argues further that it is a mistake to treat a hierarchy of masculinities constructed within gender relations as logically continuous with the patriarchal subordination of women. In response to the adverse connotations surrounding the concept, Collier[22] remarks that hegemonic masculinity is solely associated with negative characteristics that depict men as unemotional, aggressive, independent, and non-nurturing without recognizing positive behaviors such as bringing home a wage or being a father.
The masculine subject[edit]
Several authors have argued that the concept of hegemonic masculinity is based on an unsatisfactory theory of the subject because it does not rely enough upon discourses of masculinity.[3] Wetherell and Edley argue that hegemonic masculinity cannot be understood as the characteristics that constitute any group of men.[19] To Whitehead the concept fails to specify how and why some heterosexual men legitimate, reproduce, and generate their dominance and do so as a social minority since they are outnumbered by women and other men they dominate.[20] A related criticism also derives from psychoanalysis which has criticized the lack of attention given to how men actually psychologically relate to hegemonic masculinity.
The pattern of gender relations[edit]
There is considerable evidence that hegemonic masculinity is not a self-reproducing form. Demetriou suggests this is because a kind of simplification has occurred.[23] He identifies two forms of hegemony, internal and external. External hegemony relates to the institutionalization of men’s dominance over women and internal hegemony refers to the position of one group of men over all other men. Scholars commonly do not clarify or acknowledge the relationship between the two. This suggests that subordinated and marginalized masculinities do not impact the construction of hegemonic masculinity as much as critics suggest it should.
Reformulation[edit]
In one of the most widely cited works analyzing the concept, Connell and Messerschmidt sought to reformulate their theory of hegemonic masculinity in light of certain criticisms.[3] They readjusted their framework to address four main areas: the nature of gender hierarchy, the geography of masculine configurations, the process of social embodiment, and the dynamics of masculinities.
Gender hierarchy[edit]
Gender hierarchy seeks to explain not only why men hold a superior position to women but how each group influences one another. Research has documented the durability of nonhegemonic patterns of masculinity, which may represent well-crafted responses to racial/ethnic marginalization, physical disability, class inequality, or stigmatized sexuality. Hegemony may be accomplished by the incorporation of such masculinities into functioning gender order rather than by active oppression in the form of degradation or violence.[3] An example would include that of the mainstream adoption of black hip hop culture which was created in response to urban structural inequalities. Another example is that of “protest masculinity” in which local working-class settings, sometimes involving ethnically marginalized men, embodies the claim to power typical of regional hegemonic masculinities in Western countries, but lack the economic resources and institutional authority that underpins the regional and global patterns.
This new emphasis on gender hierarchy seeks to take a more relational approach to women as well. Women are central in many of the processes constructing masculinities, as mothers, schoolmates, girlfriends, sexual partners, wives, and workers in the gender division of labor. Gender hierarchies are affected by new configurations of women’s identity and practice so more attention has been given to the historical interplay of femininities and masculinities.
Geography of masculinities[edit]
Change in locally specific constructions of hegemonic masculinity has been a consistent theme of masculinity research, but given the growing attention to globalization, the significance of transnational arenas for the construction of masculinity has also been argued. Hooper described the deployment of masculinities in the arenas of international relations[24] and Connell proposed a model of “transnational business masculinity” among jet-setting corporate executives.[1] Because of this, Connell and Messerschmidt have proposed hegemonic masculinities be analyzed at three levels: local, regional, and global.[3] The links between these levels are critical to gender politics since interventions at any level giving women more power and representation can influence from the top down or from the bottom up. Additionally, adopting a framework that distinguishes between the three levels allows one to recognize the importance of place without making generalizations about independent cultures or discourses.
Social embodiment[edit]
Social embodiment calls for a more rigid definition of what a hegemonically masculine man is and how the idea is actually carried out in real life. The pattern of embodiment involved in hegemony has been recognized in the earliest formulations of the concept but called for more theoretical attention. The importance of masculine embodiment for identity and behavior emerges in many contexts. For example, in youth, skill in physical activity becomes a prime indicator of masculinity. This notion continues to manifest itself into many different health and sexual practices such as eating meat or having multiple sexual partners. The emergence of transgender issues has made it particularly clear that embodiment be given more focus in reconceptualizations.[25] The circuits of social embodiment may be very direct and simple or may be long and complex, passing through institutions, economic relations, cultural symbols, and so forth without ceasing to involve material bodies.[26]
Dynamics of masculinities[edit]
New theory has recognized the layering and potential internal contradictions within all practices that construct masculinities. This is a departure from a unitary masculinity and focus on compromised formations between contradictory desires or emotions. Masculinities are configurations of practice that are constructed, unfold, and change through time.[3] One area of focus may represent that of Western fathers given the gender division of labor in child care, the “long hours culture” of professions and management, and the preoccupation of rich fathers with managing their wealth.[3] While these practices may adhere to conventional Western ideas of hegemonic masculinity, this may not necessarily translate into a satisfying life experience. As gender relations evolve and women’s movements grow stronger, the dynamics of masculinities may see a complete abolition of power differentials and a more equitable relationship between men and women and between men and other men.[23] This positive hegemony remains a key strategy for contemporary efforts at reforming gender relations.[22]
Lifespan development[edit]
Early childhood[edit]
Children learn at an early age, mostly through educational and peer interactions, what it means to be a boy and what it means to be a girl, and are quick to demonstrate that they understand these roles.[27] This notion of “doing” gender involves differentiating between boys and girls from the day they are born and perpetuating the discourses of gender difference.[28] The idea of dualism of the genders are misconstrued by dominant ideology and feeds into social norms of masculinity. Children learn and show development of gender identity as an ongoing process, based on social situations. Gendered toys can play a large role in demonstrating the preferred actions and behavior of young boys in early childhood. The male role is also reinforced by observing older boys and reactions of authority figures, including parents.
Although gender socialization is well underway before children reach preschool, stereotypical differences between boys and girls are typically reinforced, rather than diminished, by their early educational childhood experiences.[29] Teachers have a large role in reinforcing gender stereotypes by limiting children’s choices at this young age, thus not allowing boys to explore their feelings or their understandings about gender freely. This is done through the endorsement of hegemonic masculinity embodying physical domination, strength, competitiveness, sport, courage, and aggression.[28] These gendered performances are based on society’s construction of femininity and masculinity in relation to heterosexuality. Heteronormativity is the standard for children; despite their obvious sexual innocence, heterosexuality is engrained in children in their acting of gender from an early age.[27]
Another factor that contributes to gendered behavior and roles is the greater visibility, importance, and presence of males than females in literature, and in the language that teachers use for communication and instruction. Male-generic pronouns are a special problem in early childhood settings.[29] A recommended method to help gender barriers disappear is specific training for teachers and more education on the topic for parents. Though, an ultimate conclusion by one author notes that young children know, feel, and think gender despite the wishes of adults to make gender disappear in their lives.[28]
Middle childhood[edit]
A lifespan perspective must be considered when discussing gender normalization. But one must also consider cultural hegemony in this stage of the lifespan as a child develops more of an understanding of their culture and begins to display original ideas of cultural norms as well as social norms.[30] According to the constructivist emphasis, the man/woman dichotomy is not the ‘natural’ state, but rather a potent metaphor in Western cultures.[31] Building social relationships and developing individuality are essential benchmarks for this age of middle childhood, which ranges from eight years old to puberty. A young boy is trying to navigate falling within the social structure that has been laid out for him, which includes interacting with both sexes, and a dominant notion of maleness. The gender environmentalism, which emphasizes the role of societal practices in generating and maintaining gender differentiation, still plays a part in this stage of life, but is possibly more influenced by immediate and close interactions with boys close to their age.[30] The boys organize themselves in a hierarchical structure in which the high-status boys decide what is acceptable and valued- that which is hegemonically masculine- and what is not. A boy’s rank in the hierarchy is chiefly determined by his athletic ability.[32]
When a child engages in behavior or uses something that is more often associated with the opposite sex, this is referred to as crossing gender borders. When gender borders are crossed in adolescence, the children are policed by themselves.[27] Conflicts and disagreements between boys are resolved by name-calling and teasing, physical aggression, and exclusion from the group.[32] This brings confusion to the natural order of building their individualism, and stifles their creativity and freeplay, critical to developing lifelong skills in problem solving and decision making.[33] Another notion which further confuses youth is ‘multiple masculinities’ is introduced where variables such as social class, race, ethnicity, generation, and family status determines how these young men must perform their masculinity.[31] Boys who fail to fit the social norm are forced to enter adolescence having experienced alienation from their social group and marginalized from the social order they strive to achieve in this stage of life.[32]
Adolescence[edit]
The last stage of childhood, adolescence, marks the onset of puberty and the eventual beginning of adulthood. Hegemonic masculinity then positions some boys, and all girls, as subordinate or inferior to others.[27] Bullying is another avenue in which young men assert their dominance over less “masculine” boys. In this bullying schema, adolescent boys are motivated to be at the top of the scale by engaging in more risk taking activities as well. Oftentimes bullying is motivated by social constructs and generalized ideas of what a young man should be. Gendered sexuality in adolescence refers to the role gender takes in the adolescent’s life and how it is informed by and impacts others' perceptions of their sexuality. This can lead to gay bashing and other forms of discrimination if young men seem not to perform the appropriate masculinity.
The male gender role is not biologically fixed, yet it is a result of the internalization of culturally defined gender norms and ideologies.[33] In this stage this is an important point as developmental psychologists recognize change in relations with parents, peers, and even their own self-identity. This is a time of confusion and disturbance; they feel influenced as a result of asserted hegemonic masculinity as well as social factors that lead them to become more self-conscious. Keeping this in mind, there have been some studies which indicate that the males who adopt traditional male role norms have adjustment issues later in life. De Visser et al.,[34] show that although men need not engage in all masculine behavior to be considered masculine, enacting in more masculine behaviors increases the likelihood they will be considered more masculine, otherwise known as building “masculine capital”. It has been suggested that boys’ emotional stoicism leaves them unable to recognize their own and others’ emotions, which leaves a risk for developing psychological distress and empty interpersonal skills.[33] Boys in their adolescence are pressured to act masculine in order to fit the hegemonic ideals, yet the possibility of suffering long-term psychological damage as a result looms overhead.[34]
Applications[edit]
Education[edit]
Hegemonic masculinity has been used in education studies to understand the dynamics of classroom life, including patterns of resistance and bullying among boys. It was also used to explore relations to the curriculum and the difficulties in gender-neutral pedagogy.[35] It was used to understand teaching strategies and teacher identities among such groups as physical education instructors.[36] This concept has also been helpful in structuring violence-prevention programs for youth.[37] and emotional education programs for boys.[38]
Criminology[edit]
Hegemonic masculinity has greatly influenced criminology as data reflect that men and boys perpetuate more conventional crimes and more serious crimes than women and girls. Moreover, men are responsible for much more white-collar crimes than women as well. The concept of hegemonic masculinity helped in theorizing the relationship among masculinities and a variety of crimes.[39] It was also used in studies on specific crimes by boys and men, such as rape in Switzerland, murder in Australia, football hooliganism and white-collar crime in England, and assaultive violence in the United States.[40] Regarding costs and consequences, research in criminology showed how particular patterns of aggression were linked with hegemonic masculinity, not because criminals already had dominant positions, but because they were pursuing them.[41]
Media and sports[edit]
Hegemonic masculinity has also been employed in studying media representations of men. Because the concept of hegemony helps to make sense of both the diversity and the selectiveness of images in mass media, media researchers have begun mapping the relations between different masculinities.[42] Portrayals of masculinity in men’s lifestyle magazines have been studied and researchers found elements of hegemonic masculinity woven throughout them.[43] Commercial sports are a focus of media representations of masculinity, and the developing field of sports sociology found significant use of the concept of hegemonic masculinity.[44] It was deployed in understanding the popularity of body-contact confrontational sports which function as an endlessly renewed symbol of masculinity and in understanding the violence and homophobia frequently found in sporting environments.[45]
Health[edit]
Hegemonic masculinity has been increasingly used to understand men’s health practices and determinants. Practices such as playing through physical injuries and risk-taking sexual behavior such as unprotected sex with multiple partners have been studied.[46] The concept has also been used to understand men’s exposure to risk and their difficulty in responding to disability and injury.[47] Applying this concept can also explain why men avoid talking about health problems or consulting health care when it is needed.[48] On a global scale, the impact of hegemonic masculinity has been considered in determining unequal social and political relations which are deleterious to the health of both men and women.[49]
Organizations[edit]
Hegemonic masculinity has proved significant in organizational studies as the gendered character of workplaces and bureaucracies has been increasingly recognized.[3] A particular focus has been placed on the military, where specific patterns of hegemonic masculinity have been entrenched but have been increasingly problematic.[50] These studies found that negative hegemonically masculine characteristics related to violence and aggression were required to thrive in the military at all ranks and in all branches. Additionally homophobic ideals were commonplace and further subordinated men in these positions. Studies have also traced the institutionalization of hegemonic masculinities in specific organizations and their role in organizational decision making.[51] This can be related to the glass ceiling and gender pay gap women experience.[52]
War, International Relations, and Militarism[edit]
Hegemonic masculinity has impacted both conflict and international relations, serving as a foundation for militarism. Charlotte Hooper discusses how US foreign policy, following the Vietnam War, was seen as a way of bolstering America’s manhood.[53] It was believed that the Vietcong, often categorized “as a bunch of women and children,” had humiliated and emasculated America.[53] In order to regain its manhood – both domestically and internationally –America needed to develop a hyper-masculinized and aggressive breed of foreign policy. Hooper also discusses the idea that since the international sphere is largely composed of men, it may greatly shape both “the production and maintenance of masculinities.”[53] War, then, exists in a unique feedback loop whereby it is not only perpetuated by hegemonic masculinity, but also legitimates masculinity.
Hooper discusses how military combat has been fundamental to the very composition of masculinity, “symbolically, institutionally,” and culturally through body shape.[53] Moreover, Hooper discusses how women are seen as life givers, while men are believed to be life takers.[53] Men then, can only exist as men, if they are willing to charge into war, thereby expressing their “enduring ‘natural aggression.’[53] Furthermore, this perception also explains the traditional “exclusion of women from combat,” while furthering the myth “that military service is the fullest expression of masculinity.”[53] This has troubling implications for the continuation of war, and for the enshrinement of masculine norms. Hooper also ideates about the instillation of militarized masculinity in boys, discussing how military service is a “rite of passage” for young men.[53] As such, “war and the military represent one of the major sites where hegemonic masculinities” are formed and enshrined.[53]
Militarized hegemonic masculinity has also impacted perceptions of citizenship as well as the LGBT community. Conscription is fairly common throughout the world, and has also been utilized in America during key conflicts. The majority of men expect conscription to be the price of adult citizenship, but religious objectors and homosexuals have been largely excluded from this.[53] These restrictions have led to the perceived subordinate status of these groups, and their subsequent exclusion from full citizenship, in the same fashion that women have been excluded.[53] This is reflective of the notion that men unable to, or unwilling to fight for their country are more effeminate, as they are breaking with hegemonic norms. The perceptions that homosexuals are unfit for service, and that women have a responsibility at home, is reflective of the heteronormative nature of the military. The institutional composition of the military, itself, reinforces this hegemony through the armed branch’s subordination to a “dominating and organizationally competent” branch.[53] Essentially, there is an armed wing, which is masculinized through conflict, and there is a dominating branch that is masculinized through power. The hierarchical nature of the military is used to enforce, replicate, and enhance hegemonic masculinity.
Τετάρτη 19 Ιουνίου 2013
keksi uusi juna
Paradoksaalisesti ja vastoin yleisesti tunnustettua markkinaperiaatetta valtio [veronmaksajat] on kuitenkin poliittisesti pakotettu luonnollisiin kartelleihin sisältyvien liiketoimintariskien takaajaksi ja tappioitten maksajaksi myös silloin, kun lähes valtiotonta yhteiskuntaa täysin vapaan kilpailun nimissä tekopyhästi saarnaavat uusliberaalit yksityistämiskiihkossaan ajavat junat kerta toisensa jälkeen raiteiltaan, koska mikään toimijaUlkopolitiikka kaipaa ennakkoluulotonta visiointia
Aliot | Turun Sanomat24.10.2013 02:30 | 2
.
Tasavallan presidentti kutsui kesäkuussa joukon silmäätekeviä Kultarantaan pohtimaan Suomen ulkosuhteita. Yksi tapahtuman työryhmistä oli pyhitetty ulkopolitiikan tekemisen voimavaroille.
Ryhmän vetäjä, Ulkopoliittisen instituutin johtaja Teija Tiilikainen tiivisti voimavaroihin liittyvän ongelman seuraavasti: ”Valtionhallinnon resurssit ovat pienenemään päin, samaan aikaan kun edustautumisen ja vaikuttamisen tarpeet ovat kasvusuunnassa ja muuttuvat vaativammiksi.”
Nähdäksemme kyseinen ongelma on alkanut liiaksi määrittää suomalaista perusasennetta kansainvälisistä vaikutusmahdollisuuksistamme. Ulkopoliittinen ajattelumme, uutta luova ajattelu, on jämähtänyt jonkinlaiseen resurssirealismiin, ja tämä koskee niin ulkoasiainhallintoa kuin meitä tavallisia kansalaisia, mekin teemme usein ulkopolitiikkaa. Emme ensin mieti, mitä me voisimme maailmassa tehdä ja sitten hanki aineelliset edellytykset näiden ajatusten toteuttamiseksi. Sen sijaan lähdemme liikkeelle käytettävissä olevista resursseista ja hetken pohdiskeltuamme toteamme, ettei ”niillä nyt juurikaan mitään ole tehtävissä”. Innovaatiokyky tukahtuu.
Asenne heijastelee kenties yleisemminkin tapaamme olla suomalaisina maailmassa – juuri siitä, jatkuvasta maailmasuhteemme uudelleen määrittelystä, on viime kädessä ulkopolitiikassa kyse. Epävarmuus, epävarmuus kansallisesta kyvykkyydestämme, hallitsee toisinaan edelleen toimintatapojamme. Muiden Pohjoismaiden suhtautuminen niiden kansainväliseen asemaan näyttäytyy varsin erilaisena, itsevarmempana.
Lisäksi Suomessa vallitsevat sopivaisuuden perinteet, se miten aina on tehty, heikentävät innovatiivisuutta entisestään. Kylmän sodan aikana soveliaan toiminnan rajat oli iskostettu kansakunnan mieliin vahvasti. Suomi oli lääkäri, ei tuomari. Se diagnosoi ja paransi, ei tuominnut ja paheksunut. Ajatusmalli oli pragmaattinen ja toimiva: se kantoi Suomea pitkälle kaksinapaisen maailman tyrskyissä ja tyvenissä.
Samanaikaisesti sisäpoliittinen konsensushakuisuus hallitsi ajattelua ulkopoliittisista asioista, venettä ei saanut liiaksi heiluttaa. Konsensusajattelu on parhaimmillaan yhteen hiileen puhaltamista yhteisten intressien saavuttamiseksi. Pahimmillaan se kuitenkin luo ihmiselle tarpeen ajatella myyttisen yhteisöllisen soveliaisuuden rajoissa, itseä sensuroivasti.
Sopivaisuuden rajat ovat toki höllentyneet viimeisen runsaan 20 vuoden aikana ja ulkopolitiikasta on enenevästi tullut normaalia politiikkaa. Kokonaan vanhasta perinteestä ei kuitenkaan ole päästy eroon. Kuten tekemämme lehdistöanalyysit osoittavat, suorastaan hämmentävän pieni joukko pääosin keski-ikäisiä ja sitä vanhempia miehiä Suomessa käy ulkopoliittista debattia.
Väitämme siis, ettei resurssirealismi höystettynä sopivaisuuden perinteellämme ole rikastuttava lähtökohta innovatiiviselle ulkopoliittiselle ajattelulle ja toiminnalle. Suomesta näyttää tulleen pikemminkin varovainen perushoitajaopiskelija kuin itsevarmasti hoitoja määräävä lääkäri. Reaktiivisesta, tapahtumiin kliinisesti suhtautuvasta ulkopolitiikasta on unohtunut rohkea visiointi ja perinteisten toimintamallien kyseenalaistaminen.
Idearikkaus ei välttämättä ole kiinni materiaalisista voimavaroista, mutta resurssit ovat silti oleellisia ideoinnin mahdollistajia. Ulkopolitiikkaan käytetyt varat ovat nykyisellään pienet verrattuna esimerkiksi muihin Pohjoismaihin. Tilastoista on tosin vaikea tehdä sentintarkkoja johtopäätöksiä, semminkin kun ulkopolitiikkaa tehdään nykyisin joka puolella hallintoa ja myös kansalaisyhteiskunnan toimesta. Karkeasti voidaan kuitenkin todeta, että Ruotsin ulkoministeriö käyttää kolminkertaisen summan rahaa Suomeen verrattuna. Väkiluvultaan Suomen kanssa samassa sarjassa painiva Norja pistää paremmaksi – panostus on nelinkertainen.
Myös henkilöstön suhteen Suomen panostukset ovat vaatimattoman puoleiset. Norjan Utenrikesdepartementissa työskentelee lähes kaksinkertainen määrä henkilöstöä, noin 1000 virkamiestä enemmän, kuin Suomella. Kiinnostavaa on, että puolustussektorilla meillä sen sijaan on käytössä jotensakin sama prosentti kansakunnan kokonaiskakusta kuin muilla Pohjoismailla.
Suomi on siis perusresursseiltaan verrattavissa muihin Pohjoismaihin, sekä kansantuloltaan että inhimillisen pääoman suhteen. On puhtaasti poliittinen päätös, mihin näitä resursseja viime kädessä kohdennetaan. Periaatteessa on mahdollista, että budjettipäätöksellä lisätään esimerkiksi taloudellisten ulkosuhteiden osaston resursseja moninkertaisiksi. Olisi houkuttelevaa pohtia, mitä 100 uutta virkamiestä saisi aikaan kehittäessään Suomen kauppasuhteita.
Tämänkaltaiseen pohdintaan, visiointiinkin, olemme yhteistyössä ulkoasiainministeriön kanssa haastaneet joukon eturivin kansainvälisten suhteiden tutkijoitamme. Kysymyksemme heille siis on: mitä Suomi voisi maailmassa tehdä, jos sille annettaisiin käyttöönsä vähintäänkin saman suuruusluokan resurssit kuin Norjalla? Sopivaisuuden ja traditioiden taakka olisi lisäksi nykyistä huomattavasti kevyempi, mutta muuten Suomen geopoliittinen asema Euroopan unionin pohjoisena jäsenmaana ja Venäjän naapurina olisi nykyisenlainen. Tutkijoiden artikkelit julkaistaan tällä palstalla seuraavien kuukausien aikana.
Kysymyksenasettelu lienee ainutkertainen Suomen realistisessa, kovan ulkopoliittisen keskustelun traditiossa. Luovaa ideointia suhteessa maailmaan on toki muutoin harjoitettu paljon. Esimerkiksi vuoden 2010 maabrändityöryhmä pohtii vahvasti Suomen kansainvälisen aseman parantamista, mutta ideat jäävät perin yleisluontoisiksi. Sana ”ulkopolitiikka” esiintyy yli 300-sivuisessa raportissa vain kaksi kertaa.
Jonkinasteiseen visiointiin pyrkii myös valtioneuvoston tuore selonteko EU-politiikasta, joka liputtaa ”vahvemman, yhtenäisemmän ja reilumman” unionin puolesta. Dokumentissa eritellään Suomen kannalta keskeisiä kehityskohteita, niistä tärkeimpänä unionin yhteisten ”arvojen ja sääntöjen kunnioittaminen”. Kouriintuntuvia tavoitteita, saati sitten tapoja toteuttaa näitä tavoitteita, raportista saa kuitenkin etsimällä etsiä.
Tällaisen liiallisen yleisyyden välttämiseksi pyrimme ohjaamaan tutkijoittemme huomion mahdollisimman konkreettisiin visioihin – aikajänteen visioilleen he saavat itse määrittää. Mitä voitaisiin käytännössä saada aikaiseksi YK:ssa? Mitä Suomi voisi oikeasti tehdä Keski-Aasiassa, jos meillä olisi tarpeeksi poliittista tahtoa ja itseluottamusta? Millaista olisi luova ja innovatiivinen idänpolitiikka, jossa uskallettaisiin kyseenalaistaa vanhat toimintamallit?
Viestimme siis on, että mahdollisuuksien ja vaihtoehtoisten tulevaisuuksien pohtimiseen tulisi uhrata huomattavasti enemmän energiaa, eritoten aikana, jota tuntuu määrittävän yleinen yhteiskunnallinen päämäärätiedottomuus. Ulkopolitiikkaa tulisi ajatella avoimen innovatiivisesti perinteinen ”lääkäri pikemmin kuin tuomari” -rooli sivuuttaen. Laajat resurssit voivat parhaimmillaan toimia ideoinnin alkusysäyksenä – lähtökohtaisesti Suomen tulisi panostaa paljon nykyistä enemmän ulkosuhteisiinsa – mutta voimavarojen pienuus ei silti saisi kahlita luovaa ajatustenvaihtoa.
HENRI VOGT
VILLE SINKKONEN
Alioartikkeli aloittaa Utopia ulkopolitiikassa
Πέμπτη 9 Μαΐου 2013
Dear Guests, we would like to inform you that Havataş buses depart from/to Zincirlikuyu instead of Taksim today.
tutki tutki-ja. elama etelassa sun runsasta
Τετάρτη 8 Μαΐου 2013
Δευτέρα 6 Μαΐου 2013
Κυριακή 5 Μαΐου 2013
Παρασκευή 3 Μαΐου 2013
Δευτέρα 8 Απριλίου 2013
Εγγραφή σε:
Αναρτήσεις (Atom)